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DAISY HELEN KINSLEY, sometimes 
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Individually and as Executrix of the 
E::."1:3.t.e of Otho V. Kinsley, also known 
as Otho Verne Kinsley, Deceased, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
v. 
LEWIS H. LARSEN and 
DOROTHY G. LARSEN, his wife, 
Individually, and doing busineu as 
LARSEN ENTERPISES and 
BELCO PETROLEUM 
OORPORATION, a corporation, 
Defendants & Respmdents. 
RISPONDENrS Ill• 
CASE 
NO. IOlll 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASI: 
In tllis action appellant seeks to recover trun 1\'!llll(IDCl-
ent, moneys representing approximately one-half d the 
purchase price of appellant's retamed mtere&t in certain 
oil and gas leases previously sold to respoodent, al1hou&h 
respondent has pa.id the full purchase price for 1he entire 
interest involved in this proceeding to another party to the 
law suit (not a party to this appeal since he admits lia-
bility to appellant) who acted "as agent" for appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts set forth in appellant's brit!f 
is inadequate to fully apprise the court of the facts before 
the trial judge when respondent's motion for summary 
judgment was granted. Respondent's statement of the 
facts of the case will proceed by way of providing arnplifi. 
cation and addition where appellant has failed, and point. 
ing out the inaccuracies of appellant's statements. 
Otho V. Kinsley, part owner, prior to his death, of the 
oil and gas interests involved in this case will be referral 
to as "Kinsley" while his widow, plaintiff and appellant, 
will be referred to as "plaintiff". 1Def endant, respondea 
Belco Petroleum Corporation, will be referred to as "Belco" 
and defendant, Lewis H. Larsen, will be ref erred to • 
··l..a.rEll''. 
Before setting forth the facts immediately surrow» 
ing the subject of plaintiff's law suit, it is important that 
other background facts in the record be brought to the 
court's attention to fully understand the character of tit 
overall transaction between all of the parties to the law 
suit. The first business dealings between Larsen, Kinslef 
and Belco occurred in November of 1959 (R. 52, R 82 P. 
20-22). At that time Larsen and Kinsley were the read 
owners of the two mineral leases in question (R. 11-12). 
Pursuant to negotiations between Larsen and Belco • 
ag1eernent was entered into on November 6, 1959, pr<JVid. 
ing for the assignment of the leases from Larsen and Kint 
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ley to Belco (R. 49, 51, R. 82 p. 20-21). The assignment of 
the interest retained a working interest end an over-~ 
royalty in Larsen and Kinsley ( R. 82 p. 34). Negotiations 
for the assignment provided for by the November 6, 1959 
agreement were handled exclusively by Larsen (R. 52, R. 
82 p. 1-5, 20-34). The payment of the purchase price for 
that assignment went directly to Larsen "for himself and es 
agent for others" (R. 82 p. 25-26). In that tran&actiian 
Kinsley did not give l..arsen a written power of attomey, 
nor did he supply Belco with a written document OlltJkmg 
Larsen's authority to act in Kinsley's behalf (R. 82 p. 4-5, 
R. 52). Larsen remitted to Kinsley his share ~ the pro. 
ceeds of the November 6, 1959 agreement and assignment 
of the mineral interest (R. 82 p. 27-29). In early 1962 
Larsen undertook negotiatiOllS with Belco leading up to 
the agreement of March 16, 1962 which provided fer the 
purchase by Belco of the interests retained by Larsen and 
Kinsley pursuant to the November 6, 1959 agreement (R. 
49, 50, 51, 53, R. 82 p. 36-41). Larsen acted for KBmey 
in matters pertaining to the March 16, 1962 agreement 
similarly to the manner in which he had acted tar Ktm-
ley in the November 6, 1959 agreement except that he lmd 
a telegram of authority in the Mardi 16, 1962 negotiatiaal 
(R. 82 p. 42-50). 
There are four major areas of tmdispJted ev'.cltnw 
before the court in this case which conclusively estabU8bed 
tile right of Belco to a Summary Judgment dlsn ..... 
plaintiff's claim against it. These facts are as follOWB: 
l. Telegram ~ Otho V. Kinsley 1X> Lewis H. Lanen 
dated FPbruary 15, 1962. whidl provided that "Pllramlt 
to our telephone call this evening, this will be Yam"' au-
thority to dispose of our interest at not less than $160,. 
000.00 or any amoWlt greater for which you dispose fl 
your interest" (R. 46, 77, R. 82 p. 38). This telegI'ani 
was presented by Lewis H. Larsen to Belco prior to tht 
execution of the letter agreement of March 16, 1962, and 
prior to the disbursement of the $384,000.00 purchatt 
price for the reserved mineral interests of Kinsley and w. 
sen (R. 82 p. 37, R. 53). 
2. Kinsley executed and delivered to Larsen all the 
necessary documents for the conveyance of the minenl 
interests of Kinsley which documents were delivered to 
Belco by Larsen at the time the full $384,000.00 purohaa! 
price was paid over to him "as agent" by Belco ( R. 5Q 
R. 82 p. 49-50) . 
Contrary to appellant's as;ertion in Point V of her 
brief, findings 2 and 3 of the summary judgment provki 
no more than that which appellant admits, i. e., Kins1eJ 
executed the assignments (to Belco) and placed these e.Jr-
cut.ed documents in Larsen's hands. Larsen subsequently 
delivered the documents to Belco. 
3. Larsen remitted $92,000 of the proceeds of di 
sale to Kinsley on March 31, 1962, and the plaintiff tm 
accepted and retained for her own use and benefit ttJi 
partial remittance of the money due for the sale of di 
Kinsley interest (R. 14, R. 1-10). Plaintiff and her coon-
sel have :retained a promissory note submitted by 1Au1e1 
for the balance due in payment for the Kinsley intenl 
and have made repeated attempts to collect same frGI 
Larsen and at no time prior to including Belco in the • 
tion against Larsen did plaintiff repudiate Larsen's autbrr-
ity to receive payment for the Kinsley interest, and Cllt 
L 
mwticate such repudiation to Belco or return any portioo 
of the proceeds of the sale to Belco or Larsen (R. 1-10, R. 
82 p. 55-61). 
4. After giving the mineral interest in questiun 1o 
Kinsley ( R. 82 p. 7), Larsen made an agreement setHng 
the mineral leases to Belco on November 6, 1959. 'lb! 
saJe of the lease at that time retained to Larsen and Kim-
ley the working interest and over-riding royalty for wbtdl 
the $384,000.00 was ultimately paid on March 27, 1962 (R. 
2). The payment for the transfer of the oil and ps lea8e 
in November of 1959 was made by Belco direct to I..armi 
"for himself and as agent" (R. 82 p. 25, R. 52). 'Ibat at 
the time such payment was made pursuant to the Nowm- · 
ber 6, 1959 agreement. there was no written documen at 
any kind or nature presented to Belco outlining ~ ma-
thority for Larsen to act in behalf of athe!- perm al-
though his own representations to Belco were that he acted 
for himself and others, including Kinsley CR. 51, 52). 
Lewis H~ Larsen then disblll'Sed the proceeds at said pm)'-
ment to the other parties of interest, including Klnllltv. 
Kinsley did not at any time repudiate Larsen's anttw•tt.Y 
or disclaim the proceeds of the November 6, 1959 sale (R. 
82 p. 27-28). 
Kinsley was apprised of the negotiations being con-
ducted by Larsen for the sale of the retained inte.h:st wbldl 
was consummated by the letter-agreement al March 16, 
1962 CR. 82 p. 36-41, R. 49, 50, 51, 53). Notice as to tile • 
amount of the purchase price for the retained inte1'est prior 
to the execution of the March 16, 1962 agreement wu 
immaterial due to the cont.ents of Kinsley's telegram to 
Larsen ( R. 46). 
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The execution and delivery by Kinsley to Larsen u 
the docwnents transferring the retained interest to Beko 
is clearly admitted on page 4 of plaintiff's brief where plaJn, 
tiff notes that there was no formal recorded power of at. 
torney for Larsen to act as Kinsley's agent. 
The only evidence in the record which indicates that 
Kinsley at any time received direct payments from Bib 
is contained in the answers to interrogatories by Lewi 
Larsen indicating that they so directed Belco for pay. 
ments covering royalties during the period between No. 
vember, 1959 and March, 1962 (R. 5). As to negotiatica 
and payments for the oil and gas lease (November 6, 1~ 
agreement) and the sale of the retained working interEi 
and royalteis <March 16, 1962 agreement) all negotia-
tions and payments proceeded directly by and througl 
Larsen. Plaintiff a~rts that the promissory note sm 
together with the $92,000.00 was not accepted by Kim1eJ 
or plaintiff but was retained as evidence of indebtedness. 
These assertions are not facts before the court but cai-
clusioos since the record shows that plaintiff accept.ed 1D 
$92,000.00 and appropriated same to her own use and bal-
efit through the estate of Kinsley, and did not return t!1 
p~ry note, but in fact, attempted to collect sam 
from Larsen in this lawsuit (R. 1-10. R. 82 p. 51-61). 
It should also be noted that Kinsley and Larsen d 
a portion of the mineral interest in question to a HanJ 
Royster prior to any dealings they had with Belco (R. i1 
p. 16). Larsen sent assignments to Kinsley who executld 
and returned them to Larsen for his use in consurnmam. 
the Royster sale ( R .82 p. 18) . Larsen made the deal, • 
paid directly by Royster and then issued his (Larsea'll 
7 
personal check to Kinsley for Kinsley's share of the pr<>-
ceeds of the sale (R. 82 p. 19). 
It is to be further noted that the motion for summary 
judgment filed by Beko was " ... made and based upon 
the pleadings, depositions. interrogatories, answers to in-
terrogatories, admi~ions, and all other papers on file in 
~aid cause ... " (R. 47). Plaintifrs assertion that the 
trial judge did not consider Lewis Larsen's deposition is 
therefore wholly unfounded. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
KINSLEY'S TELEGRAM AUTHORIZING LARSEN 
TO "DISPOSE OF" KINSLEY'S INTEREST AT THE 
PRICE STATED; KINSLEY'S PUTTING THE EXECU-
TED DOCUMENTS OF TRANSFER IN LARSEN'S 
HANDS AND SUBSEQUENTLY KEEPING PART OF 
TI-IE PROCEEDS OF TI-IE SALE, OONCLUSIVEL Y F.S-
T ABLISHES LARSEN AS KINSLEY'S AGENT TO SELL 
KINSLEY'S INTEREST AND RECEIVE THE PUR-
CHASE PRICE FOR SAME. 
The telegram of February 15, 1962 from Kinsley to 
Larsen was a specific authorization to Larsen to "dispolle 
of" the Kinsley interest for $160,000.00 or more. 1be 
phrase "to dispose of" in the transaction before the court 
was at least synonymous with "sell" but in fact has • 
broader meaning signifying any method of disposing of 
pmpe1ty. Words and Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 12 
A p. 505, Mc.La.ran Gold Mine Co. v. Morron, 22 P 2d 975, 
124 Mont. 382, State Ex Rel Cross v. Board of Land Com-
181. In this transa~ 
the fLxing of a minimum dollar price after using the Phra.t 
"to dispose of" resolves any question regarding the natun 
of the written authority granted to Larsen by Kinsley to 
represent him in the transaction in question. He was 
clearly an agent to sell Kinsley's interest on the fal'e ii 
the telegram so appointing him. 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion at page 9 of herb~. 
Larsen's authority by the specific language of the tefe. 
gram put in his possession by Kinsley was a clear authority 
for him to sell Kinsley's interest, and receive for Kinsley 
the proceeds of the sale. 
Restatement of Agency 2d Sec. 62 p. 170, sets for1h 
the following general rule: 
"Authority to pay or to receive purchase price 
( 1) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to con~ 
for a purchase or sale or to make or to receiw 
a conveyance on terms by which part or all a 
the price is payable at the time when the cm 
tract or conveyance is made includes authoritJ 
to pay or to receive so much of the price as ~ 
payable at such time. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to purchu 
chattels or choses in action includes authority 
to pay for them if, but only if, the agent is air 
thorized to receive possession of them or of the 
documents representing them; authority to sell 
chattels or choses in action does :r.ot include au-
thority to receive the purchase price uni~ tJw 
agent has been entrusted with them or with ii 
documents representing them." (Emphasis SllP 
plied). 
The illustration supporting the above stated general 
rule reads as follows at p. 170-171: 
"l. P gives A a power of attorney to sell and convey 
land, nothing being said therein as to the receipt of 
payment. A negotiates a sale and executes and deli-
vers a deed of conveyance and receives the purchase 
price. A is atuhorized to do this." 
Although in the case before this court, we are not 
dealing with a formal power of attorney sufficient to~ 
thorize Larsen to execute the conveyance himself, all of 
the legal elements of the rule and example are pzesent since 
a written authority to sell was given by Kinsley, and Kins-
ley placed the documents representing title to his interellt 
in Larsen's hands prior to and at the time the transactkm 
was consummated. In this respect the comment cm sub-
section ( 2) of the above quoted rule must be consldered. 
It provides as follows at p. 171: 
"b. The words, 'documents representing' a chattel or 
chosen action mean documents such as bills of lading, 
negotiable paper, and share certificates which, by law 
or custom, so far represent the interest~ the owner 
of the things to which they refer that hJs int.eresta 
therein are transferred by a transfer of the documents. 
The entrusting to the agent of such an lmtawwt la 
a form such that it may be negotiated by him is equiv-
alent to a.n entrusting of the thing lfllelf for t.be pur-
pose of the rule stated In this seefioa." (»nphula 
supplied). 
It is interesting to note that plaintiff makes a particu-
lar point of the fact that Belco attempted to deal directly 
with Kinsley in having him execute documents affecting 
the transfer to Belco of his retained interests in the oil and 
10 
gas leases. Plaintiff also points out that "Kinsley ret~ 
the various documents to Larsen, Who then delivered that 
to Belco (R. 50, Plaintiff's Brief p. 4). The record is clelr 
that Belco sent communication to Kinsley requesting u._ 
he execute the various documents and return them. ROI. 
ever, Kinsley did not choose to return communicati<11. tt 
Belco nor return the documents to Belco, but chose to tran. 
sact all his dealings with Belco back through Larsen (R. 
50). It is Belco's contention that this sWTOunding fld, 
the placing of documents of transfer in the hands of i.. 
sen, together with the telegram authorizing him to &ell • 
a stated price, are the conclusive facts as to Larsen's• 
thority to receive payment for the Kinsley interest. Al 
pointed out by plaintiff, there is no Utah case in point Cl 
the legal proposition involved herein. However, the abolt 
sl:a1l!d rules from the Restatement of Agency 2d, Supra lli 
forth the universally accepted principle which governs tll 
disposition of this case and supports the trial court's rulq 
on the motion for summary judgment. In support of :ee&. 
co's contention, the court's attention is also called to• 
statement of Agency 2d, Sec. 56 p. 162, Sec. 71 p. 183. Aia 
see Campbell v. Gowans 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac. 397. 
The court's attention is called to the annotation at I 
ALR 2d 805 and the cases supporting the above rule then 
set forth at Section 10 at p. 820. The cases in this allllt 
tation which do not support the general rule as above e 
forth are distinguishable on grounds that the admitted • 
thority given the agent was not as broad (authority to sell 
as the authority in the instant case. 
In addition to the foregoing written authorizati<Jl I 
sell coupled with the placing of documents of title in* 
11 
hands of the agent so authoriz.ed, another surrounding fact 
which confirms the authority of Larsen to receive payment 
for Kinsley is the ratification of the transactioo by plain-
tiff by her retention of nearly half of the proceeds of the 
sale remitted to her by Larsen, and her effort to collect 
trom Larsen on his promise to remit the balance embodied 
in the Promissory Note. It is to be noted that the attempts 
to collect this balance from Larsen lasted for in excess ot 
one year after plaintiffs receipt of the Primissory Note 
and the $92,000 payment. The record is bare of. any fact 
showing notice to Belco of repudiation of Lara!n's authority 
during this period, nor did plaintiff return to Belco any 
of the proceeds of the sale. All of this conduct amounts 
to ratification of Larsen's agency to receive payment for 
Kinsley. 
The court's attention is called to .S.ta*-at of Apa-
cy 2d, Section 98 p. 252, which provides as follows: 
"The receipt by a purported principal, with knowled9e 
of the facts, of something to which he would not be 
entitled unless an act purported to be done fer him 
were affirmed, and to which he makes no claim except 
through such act, constitutes an affirmance unless at 
the time of such receipt he repudiates the act. If .. 
repudiates the act, bis receipt of be&eftta .,....... t 11 
an aftirmance at the election of t.lle other puV to tll9 
tra.nsaction." (Emphasis supplied) . 
The canment on the above quoted rule aet b1ll at 
p. 252-253 is worthy of note: 
"(a). Ordinarily, the receipt by a pwported prindJlal 
who knows the facts, of thinp ro which be woa1d --
entitled unless the transaction were raU&.d 11181 tu 
which he makes no claim hlclepeacleaUy el tM met el 
12 
the purported agent, indicates his consent to ~ 
a party t.o the transaction as it was made. Even if b! 
disclaims responsibility for the act of the purportej 
agent, however, he becomes subject to liability to~ 
person from whom the things were obtained to ~ 
same extent as if he had consented to become a llal'b 
to the transaction, provided that he receives its~ 
ceeds with knowledge of the facts. Thus, if an agen 
inserts in a contract a clause not binding on the prjn. 
cipal and thereby obtains something from the other 
contracting party, the acceptance of such thing by th! 
principal with knowledge of the unauthorized clall! 
in the contract subjects him to liability upon the l'a\. 
tract as made. Likewise, if an agent or purponai 
agent obtains goods or money by a fraud for wtm 
the principal was not liable, the acceptance of the pro 
ceeds of the fraud by the principal with knowledge a 
the facts subjects him to liability for the fraud." (F.zn. 
phasis supplied) . 
Since Kinsley and plaintiff had knowledge of the fact 
that they had given a written authorization to Larsen tc 
sell their retained mineral interest, had placed in his ham 
the documents of title duly executed so that title cook! 
pass upon delivery by Larsen to Belco, and retained the 
benefits of the bargain, $92,000 having been delivered by 
Larsen to plaintiff, it cannot be said that Kinsley and plain-
tiff acted without knowledge of all the facts sllITOU11dQ 
this transaction. 
Not only, with this knowledge, did Kinsleys receive a 
substantial share of the proceeds of the sale, but have re-
tained the money so received since the transaction in quet 
tion, and still retain that money to this moment. In thil 
respect the court's attention is called to Restatement ; 
Agency 2d, Section 99 p. 256: 
"Tlw rett-ntion b~· a purported principal, with knowl-
PLige of the facts and before he has changed his posi-
tion. of something which he is not entitled to retain 
w1l~s an act purported to be done on his account is 
affirmed. and to which he makes no claim except 
through such act. constitutes an affinnance unle$ at 
the time of such retention he repudiates the act. Even 
if he repudiates the act. his retention constitutes an 
affirmance at the election of the other party to the 
transaction." (Emphasis supplied). 
The L'OU11:'s attention is also called to Restatement ot 
Agenc~· 2d, Sections 94 and 95 at pp. 242, 246. The above 
princ1ples are adhered to in Utah. M088!i v. MacFartaae, 
119 Utah 602. 230 P'2d 571. 
Without any further facts than those surrounding the 
t mnsaction as above outlined, it is clear that Larsen's au-
t honty to act in Kinsley's behalf in making the agreement, 
and in receiving payment upon transfer of documents em-
bodying title entrusted to him was clear. This establishes 
as a matter of law, agency to receive the payment and~ 
ports the trial court's decision. 
POINT Il 
THE PRIOR CONDUCT OF KINSLEY AND LAR-
SEN WHEREBY NEGOTIATIONS, SALE AND RD :El Pl' 
OF PROCEEDS OF SALE WERE ALL HANDLED 
THROUGH LARSEN WHEN THE MINERAL LEASE 
IN QUESTION WAS INITIALLY SOLD TO BELCO, ~ 
TABLISHED LARSEN AS KINSLEY'S AGENT FOR 
PURPOSES OF SELLING, AND RECEIVING PRO-
CEEDS OF THE SUBS~UENT SALE FOR 1HESE 
PARTIES, AND THE DEAD MAN'S STA'IVI'E DO~ 
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NOT RENDER LARSEN INCOMPEl'ENT AS A Wl'r. 
NESS TO THIS PRIOR COURSE OF CONDUCT. 
As heretofore set forth in the Statement of Factl, 
in November of 1959, Lewis Larsen, acting for himself,~ 
as agent for others, negotiated with Belco and ultimat.9J 
said to it the two mineral leases in questioo. At this tint 
Kinsley had an interest in the mineral leases. Kinsley eJll. 
cuted and delivered to Larsen the necessary legal docQ. 
ments assigning his interest in the mineral leases to Bekt 
Petrolemn Corporation. Larsen delivered Kinsley's asm. 
ment, together with his own assignment to Belco at Ult 
time the proceeds of the sale were pa.id. Belco issued Ila 
drafts in payment of the mineral leases in questioo " 
"Lewis H. Larsen, for himself and as agent". Larsen tbm, 
by persooal check, remitted to Kinsley the amount tb 
him for his share of the proceeds of the sale. The Novs 
ber 6, 1959 transaction retained to Kinsley and Larsen 1 
working interest and an over-riding royalty in the leaa 
niese retained interests are the subject of the instant 1-
suit. The March 12, 1962 Agreement and March 27, 1911 
payment by Belco resulted in a complete vesting in Beirl 
of all interests in the two leases in question. 
Again tuming to the Restatement for the sta.temm 
~ the general principle, the court's attention is directed • 
Restatmaent of Agency 2d, Section 26, p. 100: 
"Section 26. Creation of Authority: General Rule 
Except for the execution of instruments undlr 
seal or for the performance of transactions requll'li 
by statute to be authorized in a particular way, • 
thority to do and act may be created by written • 
spoken words or other conduct of the principal wt**' 
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reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that 
the principal desires him so to act on the principal's 
account.'' 
The comment on the above quoted rule at p. 102 of 
the above cited work and the illustration there set forth 
a.re worthy of note: 
"c. Ways of making maaifest&Uom. The authority 
to perform a particular act c'arl be ccnferred by the 
specific words of a statement to the agent; it may be 
created by directing an agent to perform acts which 
involve tht> performance of the act in question; or it 
may be inferred from words or conduct which the 
principal has reason to know indialte to the agent tDat 
he is to do the act for the benefit of the principll. '!be 
rules for the interpretation of the principal's oonduct 
are stated in SectiOl'lfi 32·81." 
"Illustrations: 
4. P delivers a chattel to A and a.uthorias tdm · 
to sell it for cash. Nothing is said a.bout delivery to 
the purchaser or the receipt of payment by A. Hav· 
ing contracted to sell the chattel, A. has authority to 
deliver the chattel to the buyer and to receive "the PD' · 
chase price." 
Silence by the principal, or failw-e to object to put 
acts of the agent, will manifest the autbarizaticn al. the 
agent to do the act in question. 'Ibe comment on the abow 
cited rule at p. 102 provides as follows: 
"d. Silence as a lll&DitNtadoL '1be manife8tatlon ot · · 
the principal may consist of his failul"e 'txJ object· to 
unauthorized conduct. See sectioo 43. 'Ibis is so if, 
in view of the relations between the prindpal ·and 
agent and all other circumstances, a reasoriaNe per-
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son in the position of the principal knowing of wta.u. 
thorized acts and not consenting to their continuance 
would do something to indicate his dissent. In sUCh 
cases the agent can reasonably inf er that the Prin-
cipal wishes him to continue so to act. Thus, a secre. 
tary who, without previous authorization, purchases 
office supplies which are paid for without ob.iecti<11 
by the principal, can .reasonably conclude that the 
principal wishes a continuance of this practice am 
hence would be authorized to continue to purchase 
similar supplies.'' 
The general rule and discusmon thereof from the Be. 
statement of Agmcy 2d is followed in the State of Utah. 
Malla, State Bank Com'r et a.I v. Giles et a.I, 100 Utah 562, 
114 P2d 208. 
In the Malia case, supra., the question involved the own-
ership by the Bank Com'r of a water company stock cer-
tificate which had been endorsed, as to the wife's interest 
therein over to the Bank by the husband. The questDI 
was Whether or not the husband was authorized to so en-
dorse the certificate over to the Bank in connection with 
all busines; affairs and dealings of the husband and wife 
with the Bank which by prior conduct the husband had 
repeatedly handled by himself. Althrugh the court fOllld 
no specific background of dealings which would justify a 
finding that the husband was authori7.ed to endorse in b 
wif~s name, the court recogni7.ed the above general prtn. 
ciples of agency relative to the manifestations of authority 
by silence or prior oonduct, and at page 211 of the Patlle 
Report the following is stated: 
''The extent of an agent's apparent authority is Id 
measured by the extent of power exercised by th! 
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agent; but by the principal's conduct with refen!flCe 
to the power exercised by the agent. Either by action 
or by inaction where there is a duty to a.ct, the prin-
dpal may create a situation the reasonable interpre-
tation of which, by a third party with whom the agent 
is about to deal, is such as to lead that third party to 
believe that the agent has authority to deal with him 
as contemplated. Under such circumstances the law 
will hold the principal responsible to that third party 
for the results of that deal with the agent. But the 
conduct of the principal must be such as occurs prior 
to the deal, and not subsequent thereto. 1be latter 
conduct may have evidentiary value as a recognition 
by the principal of his former conduct, or may evi-
dence a waiver of his right to object to lack of. au-
thority in his agent; but to be the inducement for the 
third party to enter into an agreement with the agent, 
the conduct must occur prior to the agreement." 
The court's attention is also called to C.J.S. ApaCJ 
Section 96, p. 213-14, and Restatement of ~ 2d, See--
tions 26. 34, 43 and 71. 
The testimony establishing the prior course ot oan-
duct between Larsen-Kinsley and Belco is set forth in the 
deposition of Lewis H. Larsen and the affidavits al L. E. 
Eggertsen and Lawrence Ruben. As to the deposition al 
Larsen, plaintiff interposed an objection that the same 
was inadmissible since Larsen was incompetent as a wit-
ness by the operation of the "Dead Men's Statute". This 
contention is eITOneOUs. 
The Utah "Dead Man's Statute" is found at Section 
78-24-2 (3) Utah Code Annot. 1953. In analyzing this 
statute and its applicability to Larsen in the instant cae. 
the discussion here will be confined to the first al four cat-
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egories suggested by Chief Justice Wolfe in his article "In. 
competency of Witnesses in Utah to Transactions With~ 
ceased, Insane or Incompetent Persons" 13 Rocky Mtn. L 
Rev. 282 (1941). It is to be noted as pointed out by Jus. 
ti.ce Wolfe, that all four of the following must exist to ren. 
der Larsen incompetent as a witness in these Proceedings: 
1. That Larsen is the type of person disqualified b)i 
statute. 
2. That the present action is the type of p~ 
in regard to which the disqualification exists. 
3. That the subject matter is the type as oo wtJidi 
there is a disqualification. 
4. That the disqualification has not been removed. 
A finding in favor of Belco under any of these head-
ings affirms the presumption in favor of competency d 
the witness since the statute requires the presence of eedi 
of the first three elements, ie. specific type of person, • 
c:ific type of proceeding and specific type of subject Dllt· 
ter and the absence of the last element, ie. waiver d. d> 
jection, before the statute becomes operative. 
The Utah Supreme Court has suggested that the am-
fuslon surrot.mding the Utah Statute V'8lUshes when a C8l'fo 
ful analysis of the inrent and purpose of the statute is mali 
And, the ax.u1: has anal:y7.ed the intent and purpose of UI 
statute as follows: 
'The purpose of the statute is to guard against 1il 
temptation to give false testimony in regard to a tm 
saction with a deceased person by the surviving party. 
when the transaction is involved in a lawsuit and ded 
has sealed the mouth of the other party. Furtblf 
more the statute seeks to put the two parties ~ 
terms of equality in reganl to giving evidence d. t11 
transaction . . . It was never intended that this sec-
tion should be used for the purpose of suppressing the 
truth. On the contrary, the statute's sole purpose is 
to prevent the proving by false testimony of claims 
against the estate of a deceased person." (Ma.xfteld 
v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P2d 122 {1946). 
An important consideration in the application of the 
Dead Man's Statute in this case was articulated by the 
Utah Supreme Court many years ago. 
( "T) The scope of the rule excludes the testimony 
of a survivor of the transaction with a decedent when 
offered against the latter's estate ... The statute in 
this regard is intended to protect the estates of de-
ceased persons from assaults 'and relates to proceed-
ings wherein the decision sought by the party so tes-
tifying would tend to reduce or impair the estate 
''' (l\liller v. Livingston, 31 Utah 415, 434, 88 
Pac. 338 (1906). 
Or to restate the basic policy of the statute involved 
m this case in the words of Chief Justice Wolfe: 
"On the one side is a person who is seeking to protect 
the integrity of the estate or recover assets claimed to 
belong to it; on the other side is a person who seeks 
to subtract from the estate or resist recovery of claimed 
assets. The statute is for the benefit of the first side 
and operates against the opposing party. Therefore 
when one stands on the estate, affirms and acknowl-
edges it for the support of his interest or claim whether 
that interest be derived directly or through heirs or 
other~ who took or claimed through the estate he 
can take advantage of the statute. But he whose 
claim depends upon subtracting from the estate or on 
establishing the fact that the property did not beJoog 
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to or was not derived from the estate is made inCQn. 
petent by the statute. Where all parties stand oo Ult 
estate for their rights but their controversy is oYe 
their respective shares, as in will contest, the stan.e 
does not apply." (Wolfe, Competency of Witnl'91P.g 
in Utah to Transactions with Deceased, Insane or Jn. 
cmnpetent Person, 18 Rocky Mtn. L Rev. 28'2, 21 
(1941) 
Defendant Belco contends that the basic policy of u. 
Dead Man's Statute is inapplicable to the present suit shn 
the cmt:roYersy does not concern the question of whethr 
er mt the estate of plaintiff's decedent is owed $100,00J 
for the payment ~ deceased's interest in the oil leases IQ· 
daaed by defendant Belco, but the question is Who owa 
the estate $100,000 for decedent's interest in the oil le&Sll' 
'Ibus, Belco does not seek to "reduce or impair" the estu 
er 10 otter evidence against the decedent's estate. Betm's 
<mly int.e!'est is to ascertain which party has the legal ~ 
ligatim al enhancing the estate, if in fact the estat.e Ill 
not received payment for decedent's interest in the cj 
leases. 
1be first question is whether Larsen is the type of per-
900 diSllBlified under the Utah versioo of the Dead Mam 
Statu12'! 
Sectioo 78-24-2 (3), Utah Code Annot. 1958, disqun 
fies three types of witnesses: 
1. A pu1;y to the proceedings; 
2. Any person directly interested in the event of tt1 
pnaed.i11g; 
3. Any person from, through or under whom Sid 
pmty ar interested person derives his interest or title I 
any i-rt thereof. 
From the facts of the present controversy it is readily 
apparent that Larsen does not fall within the third cate-
~ory, but. at first blush. it would seem that Larsen does 
tall within the first category, a party to the proceedings. 
The Ctah Supreme Court, however, has not given this 
13Jl.gtlage such a wide interpretation.. The court has held 
that the party must be one opposing or suing the executor 
ur administrator of the estate. To phrase the rule in short-
hand fashion the party must be one who is adverse to the 
interests of the estate. (Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 
280. 286, 172 P'2d 122 (1946). Coosequently the statute 
is inapplicable to testimony by the agent of the survivor 
or to testimony by the agent of the deceased. (Morrilon 
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 11 Utah 2d 416, 360 P2d 1015 
(1961, Wolfe, Competency of Witnesses in Utah to Tran-
sactions with Deceased, Insane or Incompetent Persons, 13 
Kooky Mtn. Law Re\·. 282. 284 (1941). 
And, the fact that the agent "may feel a moral re-
sponsibility for a mistake and seek to correct a wrong he 
believes he created does not place him in a category where 
he is a party directly interested in the event." (Sble v. 
Harper, 118 Utah 415. 222 P'2d 571 (1950). 
The next question presented by this subdiviskJn is 
whether or not Larsen is one having "a direct inten!st bl 
the particular action and not merely an interest in the es-
tate." (Clark v. George, 120 Utah, 350, 356, 234 P2d 844 
(1951). And the joinder of a persoo as a party which is 
merely nominal or for the purpose of suing m a ~ 
claim does not render that person a "party to an action"'. 
See Maxf"leld v. Sainsbury, Supra, Clark v. George, Supra, 
Anderson v. Johnso&, 121 Utah 173, 239 PM 1073 (1951); 
Sine , .. Harper, Supra, Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2.«i }l 
381 P2d 78 (1963) . 
Larsen is not being sued on the same legal tlleCI), 
Belco, even though Larsen and Belco are joined in the 
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claim. The basic theory of the claim against Larsen is GI 
version, the common law tort of exercising dominioo 1 
C<Xltrol over the property of another. (See Shi,._ 
1 
Common Law Pleading Sec. 45 ( 1923). Althoogh Heb 
joined in the same "cause of action" the basic tbeoey 1 
plaintiffs claim against Belco is debt, not the tort c1 11 
version. Thus the claim against Larsen is not the• 
as the claim against Belco. 
Moreover, Larsen has conceded the validity rl p. 
tiff's claim against him and is no more than a IDllll 
party to the law suit as far as the estate is concerned. ca 
sequently, Larsen does not fall into the category of a.._ 
with an interest in the claim as to which his ~1 
sought by Belco and does not come within the first t9 
gory of witnesses disqualified by the statute. As ima 
preme Court of Utah noted in a case analogous to the• 
usual features of this case: 
"It would seem, therefore, that 'party interested' 111 
sh<x.tld refer to a party whose interest in the event• 
the suit are adverse to the interests of the demi 
person and his estate, and not persons whose int.en1 
are with the deceased person." (Mower v ... 
64 Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911 (1924). 
The interests of defendant Belco are with the .. 
since Belco does not seek to diminish it, and, the intl!lll 
of Larsen are with the estate since Belco seeks to well 
sen's testimony in support of its claim that l..ar9eD II 
.1uthonty to eoilt'<-"t tht:> payment in controversy. For Lar-
" ·r 1 r u ll'~tlf y m &•ko' s favor would mean he is testifying 
1!1 t ;n 01 1 'f t hl' esta tl' and against his own interest--a rec-
L>:..;rn/.t·c1 •-'X!'f'J•t1on to tilt> Dead Man's Statute (MufieW v. 
Sa..inshur~ . Supra 1--and for him to testify against defend-
.-rn t Belco ;mct in fa\·or of tht:> estate would mean his interest 
is not adverse to the estate. (Mower \', Mower, Supra). 
If it is assc: rt ed that Larsen has an interest in not 
hein~ found liabl<• on a conversion theory since the estaJ:>. 
l1sh.Jnt-nt of this typt:• of debt would mean it is a non-dis-
c·har-g<~blt• ~Jt under the Bankruptcy Act (Bankrap&cy 
At·t, St'\'. 11 ta> lL~s the six categories of non-discharge-
ahl·· dl'hts I is dt"dr!y not su..~tainable. A finding that Lar-
-;pn < -onvPrtl'd the money paid him by Belco for Kinsley's 
l>cnefir d0t."S not mean that this debt of Larsen to Kins-
lL•y's Pstak is non-dischargeable. The Supreme Court has 
expressly held that Section 17 (a) (2} of the Bankruptcy 
Act does not necessarily include debts created by an ad 
uf conversion. Before the debt resulting from convenkm 
becomes a non-dischargeable debt W1Cler the Bankruptcy 
Act. it must be shown in the bankruptcy court that the 
l'Onversion was \\illful and malicious, amounting to fraud 
<tnd t~mbezzlemmt. (Da\is \", Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 
tr . .S. :~:!~ t 1 ~n-1 J. Plaintiff needs only to show a wrongful 
1•xerd.se of dominion and control by Larsen to maintain 
its second count against him. 1ln~ Larsen's liabiltty on 
plaintiff's second throry creates no adverse interest on the 
rxu1 of Larsen because of some imagined bankruptcy Pl'C>' 
L-1 "'.•din,,.-rs. Even if bankruptcy proc-eedings were instituted. 
tht• fact that Larsen was found to have converted f\mds 
\\'ould have no effect on the question of the discharge-
.!4 
abl11t\ l)J th1· th·ht m i>anknlpky. 
a.D<'t" ('o., :-;upra I 
\\ lwth.T •1 dt. ht 1s disc:hargcablt' or not in b· 
1s a qc.i··..;t1· •n to I)(' rl1."<.·icil'd b~ tht.' bankruptcy court. 
l"&I Loan Co. , .. Hunt, :!9:2 lJ. S. :!:).t t 1 ~H-1). 
It rht•r'f'fort' S(.>t'ms dear that the "Dead Man's 
0(~ not n•n<it-r Larst.'n ineomp~'tent a<\ a witness in 
pnxi:>t·din:.::-.; because ht.• is not a person disqualified by 
... tatute. bt•mg only a nominal pa11y, having admitted 
liab1lit~ to the estate and thus not directly interet1ta1 
the t"'\'1._~t of the> proceeding. His (Larsen's) ~ 
therefore admissable to conclusively establish the · 
course of dealings between himself and Kinsley in 
leading up to and including the transaction in questQ. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons here set forth. it is submitted 
the judgment of the lower court was correct am 
be affumed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GIDRGE E. BALLIF, for 
BALLIF & BALLIF 
84 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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